LANGUAGE AND CULTURE

1.Introduction

The relationship between language and culture is one of many topics or issues discussed in Sociolinguistics. According to Trudgill (1974) in Sumarsono (2009) Sociolinguistics is defined as the study of a language as a part of culture and society. From the definition above, it is emphasized that language is a part of culture and cannot separated each other. Criper and Widowson (1975) in Sumarsono (2009) stated that Sociolinguistics is the study of language in operation. Its purpose is to show how the convention of language use relates to other aspect s of culture. In other words, in Sociolinguistics, we study language, culture and the relationship between them.

There are a lot of theories concerned with language and culture. Some theories stated that language is a part of culture. Others said that language and culture are two different things that have a much closed relation. In one hand, it is claimed that language is much more influenced by culture. As a result, all things included in culture can be manifested in language. In the other hand, it is also stated that language much influenced the culture and the way of thought of the society in which the language is used. (Khair and Agustina, 2010, p. 162 )

In this paper, the writer will discuss the nature of relationship between language and culture based on the existed theories and it will focus on `Whorfian Hypothesis` and the theories which are opposite to it. Besides, the writer will also discuss the various ways in which language and culture have been said to be related. They are kinship system, taxonomies, color terminology, and taboo and euphemism.

Before the writer much further talks about the relationship between language and culture, to give clear concept, it is better for us to define what language and what culture are. Traditionally, language has been viewed as a vehicle of thought, a system of expression that a person mediates the transfer of thought from one person to another. (Finegan, Besiner, Blair, and Collins, 1992. p.3) Linguistically, language is defined as an arbitrary vocal system used by human beings to communicate with one another.( 1992. p. 9) Awhile, culture, in this context, is defined in the sense of whatever a person must know in order to function in a particular society, not in the sense of `high culture` like the appreciation of music, literature, the arts, etc. Goodenough ( 1957, p. 167) gives the definition of culture as ` a society`s culture consists of whatever it is one has to know or believe in order to operate in a manner acceptable to its member, and to do so in any role that they accept for any one of themselves.` In other words, culture is the `knowhow` that a person must possess to get through the task of daily living. (Wardhaugh, 1998, p. 215)

2. The Whorfian Hypothesis

One of the existed theories concerning the relationship between language and culture was founded by Edward Sapir and his student Benjamin Lee Whorf. This theory is known as Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Some sociolinguists tend to use the term `Whorfian hypothesis` because the claim seems to be much more concerned with Whorf than it does to Sapir. Based on this hypothesis, the structure of a native language determines the way in which speakers of that language view the world. The way of thought of society is really determined by the language used.(Wardhaugh, 216) Sapir in his book `Language` (1929, p. 207) as quoted by Wardhaugh stated that human beings do not live in the objective world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. (p. 216) This idea was extended and strengthened by his student Benjamin Lee Whorf. Whorf stated that the background linguistics system called `grammar` of each language is not merely a reproducing instrument for voicing ideas but rather is itself the shaper of ideas, the program and guide for the individual`s mental activity, for his analysis of impression, for his synthesis for his mental stock in trade. Formulation of ideas is not an independent process, strictly rational in the old sense, but is part of a particular grammar, and differs from slightly to greatly, between different grammar. (Carroll, 1956, pp. 212)

According to Whorf, different speakers will experience the world differently insofar as the language they speak differ structurally, and most of us are not aware of all the subtleties of structural differences among language can avoid seeing the world as it is rather than as it is presented through the screen of the language.(Wardhaugh, p. 217) This case can be exemplified by Javanese words `jaran` for `horse` and `belo` for `the kid of horse` known by Javanese children. These two words will influence their view when they learn Indonesian language. They will ask in his mind the word for `belo` in Indonesian. Awhile Indonesian has no word for it. (Sumarsono, p.59) Other example is that the linguistic structure of Hopi is different from that of English, German, French called as Standard Average European (SAE). Hopi grammatical categories provide a `process` orientation toward the world, whereas the categories in SAE are a fixed orientation toward time and space so that they not only `objectify` reality in certain ways but even distinguish between things that must be counted, e.g., trees, hills, waves, and sparks, and those that need not to be counted, e.g., water, fire, and courage.In SAE events occur, have occurred, or will occur, in a definite time, i.e., present, past, or future; to speaker of Hopi, an event can be warranted to haved occurred, or to be occurring, or to be expected to occur. From these linguistic structure phenomena, Whorf concluded that these differences lead speakers of Hopi and SAE to view the world differently. (Wardhaugh, p. 219)

Concerning with the claims made in Whorf hypothesis, Fishman (1972) claims that `if speakers of one language have certain words to describe things and speakers of another language lack of similar words, the speakers of the first language will find it easier to talk about those things` We can see this case on using the vocabularies of certain occasion like in profession; for example, physicians talk easily about medical phenomena, more easily than other profession like technical engineers, because physicians have the vocabulary to do so. Moreover, It is claimed that if one language makes distinctions that another language does not make, then those who use the first language will more readily perceive the differences in their environment which such linguistics distinctions draw attention to. .(Wardhaugh, p. 217)

There ia another opinion that language and culture are two different things and they have close relationship. Silzer (1990) stated language and culture are like twins. What is in culture will be seen in language and vice versa. For example, In English and other European languages that are not familiar with eating rice, rice is the only one word for all kinds of rice. But in Indonesian, there are various kinds of words referring to rice, that is, padi, gabah, beras, and nasi. English societies know the difference of the four different words, but they don`t need to differ them. On the contrary, English societies are familiar with horse racing. They have `horse`, `colt`, `stallion`, `pony`, and `mare` for the word`horse`. But in Indonesian, there is only one word for `horse` because they feel they don`t need to differenciate it although they know the difference. (Chaer and Agustina, p. 168)

In contrast to Whorfian hypothesis, an anthropologist, Koentharaningrat, (1990) said that culture influences language.In this case, the relation can be as mainsystem and subsystem. Culture is considered as the main system and language as the subsystem. For example, if we praise someone with `Bajumu bagus sekali`, `Wah, rumah saudara besar sekali`, someone whom we praise seems to be shy and directly says``Ah, itu Cuma baju murahan, kok`, `beginilah namanya rumah di kampung`. In English, in contrast, someone will say `thank you` if s/he gets a kind of praise. (Chaer and Agustina, p. 170) This condition shows that the culture of English and Indonesian is different. So, the difference will be seen in the use of the language itself.

3. Kinship System

One thing that can show the way in which people use language in daily living and show the relation between language and culture is in the case of kinship system. Kinship system is a universal feature of language because it is so important in social organization. Some systems are much richer than others, but all systems make use of such factors as sex, age, generation, blood, and marriage. Different kinship system will carry idea on how such people ought to call and behave towards others in the society that uses that system. This can be shown through the vocabularies used in different language. For example,the word ` family` in English has the same meaning as `keluarga` in Indonesian. For English, the word` family` includes husband, wife, and children. In contrast, in Indonesian the word `keluarga` includes more than husband, wife, and children. It rather includes grandparents, uncle, aunt, cousin, niece, nephew and so on.(Sumarsono, 2009, p. 62)

It is important to remember that when a term like father, brother, or older brother is used in a kinship system that it carries with it ideas about how such people ought to behave towards others in the society that uses that system. Fathers,brothers, and older brothers are assumed to have certain rights and duties. In practice, of course, they may behave otherwise. It is the kinship system which determines who is called what; it is not the behavior of individuals which leads them to be called this or that.(Wardhaugh, p. 226)

According to Sumarsono, there are two important terms that can be differenciated in this context. The first term is called `term of reference` This term refers to the words of kinship system, i.e. brother, sister, father, uncle, cousin etc in English. In Sasak, there are `inak`, `amak`, `papuk`, `balok`, `anak`. The second term called `term of address` refers to how we call or address the member of the family like `bi` for Indonesian for `aunt`, `pakl$$ek` for `older uncle from father or mother in Javanese, `amak kake`, `inak kake`, `saik` in Sasak. (p.63)

4. Folk Taxonomy

According to Berlin (1992) in Wardhaugh, folk taxonomy is a way of classifying a certain part of reality so that it makes some kinds of sense to those who have to deal with it. Typically, such taxonomies involve matters like naturally occurring flora and fauna in the environment, but they may also others matters too. One the best-known studies of a folk taxonomy is Frake’s account (1961) of the terms that the Subanun of Mindanao in the southern Philippines use to explain disease of the skin. Effective treatment of any disease depends on proper diagnosis, but that depends on recognizing the symptoms for what they are. (Wardhaugh, 1998, 227)

Diagnosis is the process of finding the appropriate name for a set of symptoms. Once that name is found, treatment can follow. However, we can see that the success of that treatment depends critically not only on its therapeutic value but on the validity of the system of classification for diseases. That system is rather a “folk” one, not a scientific one.

According to Berlin (1992) in Mifflin Folk taxonomies have hierarchical levels similar to formal biological classifications of kingdom, phylum, class, order, family, genus and species (Berlin, 1992). In folk taxonomy, the common levels are life from, generic, specific and varietal.

4.1. Life form

A high level category of plants or animals that share some general shape or characteristic of their morphology. Examples: tree, vine, bush, fish, snake, bird, wug, or mammal.

4.2. Generic

The most common, basic level. Examples are dog, oak, grass, rice, ant. Folk generally often do not correspond to scientific genera but may correspond to Linnaean species or families. For instance, “dog” is a folk genus, but “grass” is a Linnaean species folk genus, and a Linnaean family (actually a little less, since people generally do not recognize maize, etc. as grasses); “rice” is a folk genus, but two Linnaean; species and “ant” is a folk genus, but a Linnaean family, formicidae.

4.3. Specific

In some languages such as Spanish, Bahasa (spoken in Indonesia and Malaysia), the generic name comes first, as in a Linnaean name. In other languages such as English, it is the other way around. The specific name tends to be a pneumonic device, e.g., color, shape, utility, etc. that makes the name easy to remember.

4.4 Varietal

Common in crops such as the potato. Examples are papa imilla, papa imilla negra, and papa imilla blanca.

Farmer's Classification of Leaf Feeding Insects

Figure 1. Farmers’ classification of leaf feeding insects in Leyte, Philippines.

Carolus Linnaeus, an 18th-century Swedish botanist, devised the system of binomial nomenclature used for naming species. In this system, each species is given a two-part Latin name, formed by appending a specific epithet to the genus name. By convention, the genus name is capitalized, and both the genus name and specific epithet are italicized, for Canis familiaris or simply C. familiaris. Modern taxonomy is currently in flux, and certain aspects of classification are being refined. This table shows one traditional classification of five species of life out of the estimated five million species of the world. This table shows one traditional classification of five species of life out of the estimated five million species of the world.

Common Name Kingdom Phylum* Class Order Family Genus Species

DomesticatedDog Animalia(animals) Chordata Mammalia Carnivora Canidae Canis C. familiaris

Sugar Maple Plantae(plants) Magnoliophyta Rosidae Sapindales Aceraceae Acer A. saccharum

Bread Mold Fungi(fungi) Zygomycota Zygomycetes Mucoralis Mucoraceae Rhizopus R. stolonifer

TuberculosisBacterium Prokaryotae(bacteria) Firmicutes Actinobacteria Actinomycetales Mycobacteriaceae Mycobacterium M. tuberculosis

Pond Alga Protista(algae,diatoms) Chlorophyta Euconjugatae Zygnematalis Zygnemataceae Spirogyra S. crassa

In Sasak language is also found the folk taxonomy. For example the kinds of “House”, there are ‘Bale Balaq’, ‘Bale Pager’, ‘Bale Batu’, ‘Bale Betingkat’. Then, the kind of disease of Sasak language. Based on where the the diseases is felt. For example, ‘Sakit kaki’, ‘sakit jejengku’, ‘sakit tian’, ‘sakit angen’, ‘sakit dade’, ‘sakit belong’, and ‘sakit otak’.

5. Color Terminology

Color terminology has also been used to explore the relationship between different language and culture. Sometimes we cannot directly translate color words from one language to another without introducing subtle changes in meaning, e.g., English `brown` and French `brun`.

All languages make use of basic color term. A basic color term must be a single word, e.g., blue or yellow, not some combination of words, e.g.,light blue or pole yellow.

According to Berlin and Kay (1969) in Wardaugh, an analysis of the basic color terms found in a wide variety of languages reveals certain very interesting patterns. If a language has only two terms, they are for equivalents to black and white (or dark and light). If a third is added, it is red. The fourth and fifth terms will be yellow and green, but the other may be reserved. The sixth and seventh terms are blue and brown. Finally, as in English, come terms like grey, pink, orange, and purple, but not in any particular order. In this view there are only eleven basic color terms. All other terms for colors are combinations like greyish-brown, variation like scarlet, modifications like fire-engine red, and finally the kinds of designations favored by paint and cosmetic manufacturers. Wardaugh, 1998. Pp. 230)

Two points about color terminology seem particularly interesting. The color spectrum is an objective fact: it is “out there”, waiting to be dealt with cognitively. Apparently, human cognition is so alike everywhere that every one approaches the spectrum in the same way. Moreover, as cultural and technological change occur, it becomes more and more necessary for people to differentiate within the color spectrum. Instead of picking bits and pieces of spectrum at random as it were and naming them, people, no matter what languages they speak, progressively sub-devide the whole spectrum in a systematic way. The second points are that, if speakers of any language are asked to identify the parts of the spectrum, they find one system of such identification much easier to manipulate than another. They find it difficult to draw a line to separate that part of the spectrum they would call yellow from that part they would call orange, or similarly to separate blue from green. That is, assigning precise easy task for individuals nor one on which groups of individuals achieve a remarkable consensus. However, they do find it easy and they do reach a better consensus, if they are required to indicate some parts of the spectrum they would call typically orange, typically blue, or typically green. That is, they have consistent and uniform ideas about “typical” colors. Speakers of different languages exhibit such a behaviour always provided that the appropriate color terms are in their languages.(Wardaugh, 231)

Color terminology also found in sasak terminology, for example the term “red” is means “abang” (in ngeno-ngene dialect) and “beaq” (in other four dialects). This color of “abang” can be “abang odak” , “abang toak”, “abang daraq”, and “lempok lomak”.

6. Prototype Theory

Prototype theory is also one easier account of which leads how people learn to use language, particularly linguistics concept. Hudson (1996, pp.75-8) believes that protype theory has much to offer sociolinguistics. According to him, prototype theory may even be applied to the social situation in which speech occurs. He suggests that, when we hear a new linguistic item, we associate with it that typically seems to use it and what, apparently, is the typical occasion of its use. Moreover, we need very few instances-even just a single one- to be able to do this. Prototype theory, then, offers us a possible way of looking not only at how concepts may be formed, for example, at the cognitive dimensions of linguistic behavior, but also at how we achieve our social competence in the use of language.(Wardhaugh, 1998, pp.232-233)

Rosch (1976) in Wardhaugh (1998) has proposed an alternative to the view that concept are composed from sets of features which define instances of a concept necessarily and sufficiently. He proposes that concepts are best viewed as prototype. For example, a bird is not best defined by reference to a set of features that refer to such matters as wings, warm bloodedness, and egg laying characteristics, but rather by reference to typical instances. Thus, a `prototypical bird` is something more like a robin than it is likea toucan, penguin, ostrich, or even eagle.(Wardhaugh,232)

Most experiments has shown that people do classify quite consistently objects of various kinds based on what they regard as being typical instance. For example, (1) furniture; a chair is a typical term of furniture, an ashtray is not, (2) fruit; apples and plums are typical term of fruit, coconuts and olives are not, and (3) clothing; coats and trousers are typical term of clothing, bracelets and purses are not ( Clark and Clark , 1977 in Wardhaugh, p. 232)

7. Taboo and Euphemism

In one sense, language is used to express cultural meaning. But in other sense, it is used to avoid saying certain things and express them in other expression. Certain things are not said, not because they cannot be, but because people don`t talk about those things, or if those things are talked about, they are talked about in very roundabout ways. In the first case we have instances of linguistic taboo; in the second we have the employment of euphemism so as to avoid mentioning certain matters directly. (Wardhaugh, p.234)

A taboo is a strong social prohibition (or ban) relating to any area of human activity or social custom that is sacred and forbidden based on moral judgement and sometimes even religious beliefs. Breaking the taboo is usually considered objectionable or abhorrent by society. The term comes from the Tongan language, and appears in many Polynesian cultures. In those cultures, a tabu (or tapu or kapu) often has specific religious associations. When an activity or custom is a taboo, it is forbidden and interdictions are implemented concerning it, such as the ground set apart as a sanctuary for criminals. Some taboo activities or customs are prohibited under law and transgressions may lead to severe penalties. Other taboos result in embarrassment, shame, and rudeness. Although critics and/or dissenters may oppose taboos, they are put into place to avoid disrespect to any given authority, be it legal, moral and/or religious.

Common etymology traces taboo to the Tongan word tapu or the Fijian word tabu] meaning "under prohibition", "not allowed", or "forbidden". In its current use in Tonga, the word tapu also means "sacred" or "holy", often in the sense of being restricted or protected by custom or law. In the main island of the Kingdom of Tonga, where the greater portion of the population reside within the capital Nuku'alofa, the word is often appended to the end of "Tonga", making the word "Tongatapu", where local use it as "Sacred South" rather than "forbidden south".

Taboos can include dietary restrictions (halal and kosher diets, religious vegetarianism, and the prohibition of cannibalism), restrictions on sexual activities and relationships (sex outside of marriage, adultery, intermarriage, miscegenation, homosexuality, incest, animal-human sex, adult-child sex, sex with the dead), restrictions of bodily functions (burping, flatulence, restrictions on the use of psychoactive drugs, restrictions on state of genitalia such as circumcision or sex reassignment), exposure of body parts (ankles in the Victorian British Empire, women's hair in parts of the Middle East, nudity in the US), and restrictions on the use of offensive language.

No taboo is known to be universal, but some (such as the cannibalism, exposing of intimate parts, intentional homicide, and incest taboos) occur in the majority of societies. Taboos may serve many functions, and often remain in effect after the original reason behind them has expired. Some have argued that taboos therefore reveal the history of societies when other records are lacking.

In regard to linguistic taboo, there has been a considerable change since the late twentieth century. The decline may have been more increasing in the use of euphemistic language. Euphemistic words and expressions allow us to talk about unpleasant things and disguise or neutralize the unpleasentness, e.g. the subject os sickness, death, unemployment, and criminality. They also allow us to give labels to unpleasant tasks and jobs in an attempt to make them sound almost attractive. Euphemism is endemic in our society: the glorification of the commonplace and the elevation of the trivial.(Wardhaugh, 235)

In conclusion, taboo and euphemism affect us all. We may not be deeply conscious of the effects, but affect us they do.We all probably have a few things we refuse to talk about and still others we do not talk about directly. We may have some words we know but never-or hardly ever- use because they are too emotional for either us or others. Awhile we may find some thought too deep for words, others we definitely take care not to express at all even though we know the words, or else we express ourselves on them very indirectly. (Wardhaugh, 236)

In Sasak the relation between language and culture can also be shown by taboo. Some taboos are based on the religious concept, some are based on custom and traditional belief, and some are based on moral judgment. There are some kinds of taboo in Sasak language based on religion concept, for example, dietary restrictions. For Sasak people, especially Muslim Sasak, it is forbidden to eat certain animals like dog, pig, and etc. Also, it is taboo to take the oath like “Bani Haram”, “Bani Pekek”, “ Bani Bedok”, and etc.

Based on traditional belief, it is taboo for Sasak People to say “ Antih aku” when the people pass through forest or big river because it is believed that if someone say “antih aku” in the forest, there will be a wild animal that waits for him, or if someone say ‘antih aku’ in the river there will be crocodile that waits for him.

Meanwhile, based on moral judgment or moral value of Sasak, it is taboo to mention directly the name of genitalia. For example “Lesek” for man and “Pepek” for woman. But these two words can be replaced by “Perabot dengan mame” and “Perabot dengan nine”. So in this case, we use euphemism to replace the word taboo as mentioned about.

8. Conclusion

1. There are some theories related to the relationship between language and culture. One theory stated that language influenced culture and the way of thought of the society in which the language is used. This theory is called Whorfian Hypothesis. Other said that language is much influenced by culture and as a part of culture. The other one stated that language and culture are two different things that have a very close relation.

2. There are various ways in which language and culture have been claimed to be closely related. They are kinship system, color terminology, taxonomies, and taboo and euphemism.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Chaer, Abdul and Agustina, Leonie. 2010. Sociolinguistics : Perkenalan Awal. Rineka Cipta. Jakarta

Finegan, Edward, Besiner, Niko, Blair, David and Collins, Peter. 1992. Language `It`s Structure and Use` .Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Group Ltd. Australia.

Mifflin,H.2000 `Taxonomy Life` taken from http://www. Answers.com/topic/Taxonomy.xzz lackyqih B/;Monday, October 3th, 09.00 PM.

Sumarsono, M.Ed, Dr, Prof. 2009. Sosiolinguistik. Pustaka Fajar, Sabda. Cileban Timur, Yogyakarta.

Wardhaugh, Ronald. 1998. An Introduction to Sociolinguistics. Third edition. Blackwell Publishers Ltd. UK

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LANGUAGE AND GENDER

A. INTRODUCTION

Language and gender is an area of study within sociolinguistics, applied linguistics, and related field that investigates varieties of speech associated with a particular gender, or social norms for such gendered language use. A variety of speech (or sociolect) associated with a particular gender is sometimes called a genderlect.

Wardhaugh (2002) stated that a major topic in sociolinguistics is the connection between structures, vocabularies, and ways of using particular languages and the social roles of men and women who speak the language.

Issues about gender and language have a long history but its status as fields of research developed alongside the second wave of feminism during the 1960s and 1970s (Weatherall, 2002). Based on these issues, this article will explain; the term sex and gender, dominance and difference, gender and speech style, speech practices associated with gender, and cross gender conversation.

B. THE TERM “SEX AND GENDER”

Sex is a biological condition which defined as a set of physical characteristics. However, Gender is a social construct (within the fields of cultural and gender studies, and the social sciences. Kaminer (1998) stated that general usage of the term gender began in the late 1960s and 1970s, increasingly appearing in the professional literature of the social sciences. The term helps in distinguishing those aspects of life that were more easily attributed or understood to be of social rather than biological origin. According to Aristotle, the Greek philosopher Protagoras used the terms masculine, feminine, and neuter to classify nouns, introducing the concept of grammatical gender.

Wardhaugh (2002) further stated that sex is a very large extent biologically determined whereas gender is a social construct involving the whole gamut of genetic, psychological, social, and cultural differences between males and females.

While, Camereon in Wardaugh (2002) also stated that Men and women are members of cultures in which a large amount of discourse about gender is constantly circulating. They do not only learn , and then mechanically reproduce, ways of speaking ‘appropriate’ to their own sex; they learn a much broader set of gendered meanings that attach in rather complex ways to different ways of speaking, and they produce their own behavior in the light of these meaning.

C. DOMINANCE AND DIFFERENCE

Studies of language and gender often make use of two models or paradigms - that of dominance and that of difference. The first is associated with Dale Spender, Pamela Fishman, Don Zimmerman and Candace West, while the second is associated with Deborah Tannen.

1. Dominance theory

This is the theory that in mixed-sex conversations men are more likely to interrupt than women. It uses a fairly old study of a small sample of conversations, recorded by Don Zimmerman and Candace West at the Santa Barbara campus of the University of California in 1975. The subjects of the recording were white, middle class and under 35. Zimmerman and West produce in evidence 31 segments of conversation. They report that in 11 conversations between men and women, men used 46 interruptions, but women only two. As Geoffrey Beattie, of Sheffield University, points out (writing in New Scientist magazine in 1982): "The problem with this is that you might simply have one very voluble man in the study which has a disproportionate effect on the total." From their small (possibly unrepresentative) sample Zimmerman and West conclude that, since men interrupt more often, then they are dominating or attempting to do so.

Fortunately for the language student, there is no need closely to follow the very sophisticated philosophical and ethical arguments that Dale Spender erects on her interpretation of language. But it is reasonable to look closely at the sources of her evidence - such as the research of Zimmerman and West. Geoffrey Beattie claims to have recorded some 10 hours of tutorial discussion and some 557 interruptions (compared with 55 recorded by Zimmerman and West). Beattie found that women and men interrupted with more or less equal frequency (men 34.1, women 33.8) - so men did interrupt more, but by a margin so slight as not to be statistically significant.

2. Deborah Tannen and difference

Professor Tannen has summarized her book You Just Don't Understand in an article in which she represents male and female language use in a series of six contrasts. These are:

• Status vs. support

• Independence vs. intimacy

• Advice vs. understanding

• Information vs. feelings

• Orders vs. proposals

• Conflict vs. compromise

a) Status versus support

Men grow up in a world in which conversation is competitive - they seek to achieve the upper hand or to prevent others from dominating them. For women, however, talking is often a way to gain confirmation and support for their ideas. Men see the world as a place where people try to gain status and keep it. Women see the world as “a network of connections seeking support and consensus”.

b) Independence versus intimacy

Women often think in terms of closeness and support, and struggle to preserve intimacy. Men, concerned with status, tend to focus more on independence. These traits can lead women and men to starkly different views of the same situation. Professor Tannen gives the example of a woman who would check with her husband before inviting a guest to stay - because she likes telling friends that she has to check with him. The man, meanwhile, invites a friend without asking his wife first, because to tell the friend he must check amounts to a loss of status.

c) Advice versus understanding

Deborah Tannen claims that, too many men a complaint is a challenge to find a solution. For example; when a wife tells a husband that she doesn't feel well, her husband will invariably offers to take her to the doctor. Men are likely giving advice rather than giving sympathy to show his understanding. Invariably, the woman is disappointed with his reaction. Like many men, he is focused on what he can do, whereas women want sympathy.

d) Information versus feelings

A young man makes a brief phone call. His mother overhears it as a series of grunts. Later she asks him about it - it emerges that he has arranged to go to a specific place, where he will play football with various people and he has to take the ball. A young woman makes a phone call - it lasts half an hour or more. The mother asks about it - it emerges that she has been talking “you know” “about stuff”. The conversation has been mostly grooming-talk and comment on feelings.

Historically, men's concerns were seen as more important than those of women, but today this situation may be reversed so that the giving of information and brevity of speech are considered of less value than sharing of emotions and elaboration. From the viewpoint of the language student neither is better (or worse) in any absolute sense.

e) Orders versus proposals

Women often suggest that people do things in indirect ways - “let's”, “why don't we?” or “wouldn't it be good, if we...?” Men may use, and prefer to hear, a direct imperative.

f) Conflict versus compromise

“In trying to prevent fights,” writes Professor Tannen “some women refuse to oppose the will of others openly. But sometimes it's far more effective for a woman to assert herself, even at the risk of conflict. ” This situation is easily observed in work-situations where a management decision seems unattractive - men will often resist it vocally, while women may appear to accede, but complain subsequently. Of course, this is a broad generalization - and for every one of Deborah Tannen's oppositions, we will know of men and women who are exceptions to the norm.

Report talk and rapport talk

Deborah Tannen's distinction of information and feelings is also described as report talk (of men) and rapport talk (of women). The differences can be summarized in a table:

Women Men

• Talk too much

• Speak in private contexts

• Build relations

• Overlap

• Speak symmetrically • Get more air time

• Speak in public

• Negotiate status/avoid failure

• Speak one at a time

• Speak asymmetrically

D. SPEECH PRACTICES ASSOCIATED WITH GENDER

1. Minimal responses

One of the ways in which the communicative behavior of men and women differ is in their use of minimal responses, i.e., paralinguistic features such as ‘mhm’ and ‘yeah’, which is behavior associated with collaborative language use. Men, on the other hand, generally use them less frequently and where they do, it is usually to show agreement, as Don Zimmerman and Candace West’s study of turn-taking in conversation indicates.

While the above can be true in some contexts and situations, studies that dichotomize the communicative behavior of men and women may run the risk of over-generalization. For example, "minimal responses appear "throughout streams of talk", such as "mm" or "yeah", not only function to display active listening and interest and are not always signs of "support work", as Fishman (1978) claims. They can - as more detailed analysis of minimal responses show -- signal understanding, demonstrate agreement, indicate skepticism or a critical attitude, demand clarification or show surprise". In other words, both male and female participants in a conversation can employ these minimal responses for interactive functions, rather than gender-specific functions.

2. Questions

Men and women differ in their use of questions in conversations. For men, a question is usually a genuine request for information whereas with women it can often be a rhetorical means of engaging the other’s conversational contribution or of acquiring attention from others conversationally involved, techniques associated with a collaborative approach to language use. Therefore women use questions more frequently. In writing, however, both genders use rhetorical questions as literary devices. For example, Mark Twain used them in "A War Prayer" to provoke the reader to question his actions and beliefs. Tag questions are frequently used to verify or confirm information; though in women’s language they may also be used to avoid making strong statements.

3. Turn-taking

As the work of Victoria De Francisco shows, female linguistic behavior characteristically encompasses a desire to take turns in conversation with others, which is opposed to men’s tendency towards centering on their own point or remaining silent when presented with such implicit offers of conversation.

4. Changing the topic of conversation

According to Bruce Dorval in his study of same-sex friend interaction, males tend to change subject more frequently than females. This difference may well be at the root of the conception that women chatter and talk too much, and may still trigger the same thinking in some males. In this way lowered estimation of women may arise. Incidentally, this andocentric attitude towards women as chatterers arguably arose from the idea that any female conversation was too much talking according to the patriarchal consideration of silence as a womanly virtue common to many cultures. Goodwin (1990) observes that girls and women link their utterances to previous speakers and develop each other topics, rather than introducing new topics. However, a study of young American couples and their interactions reveal that while women raise twice as many topics as men but it is the men's topics that are usually taken up and subsequently elaborated in the conversation.

5. Self-disclosure

Female tendencies toward self-disclosure, i.e., sharing their problems and experiences with others, often to offer sympathy, contrasts with male tendencies to non-self disclosure and professing advice or offering a solution when confronted with another’s problems.

6. Verbal aggression

Men tend to be more verbally aggressive in conversing, frequently using threats, profanities, yelling and name-calling. Women, on the whole, deem this to disrupt the flow of conversation and not as a means of upholding one’s hierarchical status in the conversation. Where women swear, it is usually to demonstrate to others what normal behavior is for them.

However, the correlation between males and verbal aggression may not apply across different societies and cultures. For examples, Kulick (1992) shows how this stereotype regarding verbal aggression is subverted in his study of two different speech genres in Gapun, Papua New Guinea. Women engage in kros, or "angry talk", which is typically characterized by vituperative and brazen displays of insults and shouting. Conversely, the men partake in men's house talk, which is focused on the down play of conflict in order to maintain - or at least give - the illusion of harmony.

7. Listening and attentiveness

It appears that women attach more weight than men to the importance of listening in conversation, with its connotations of power to the listener as confidant of the speaker. This attachment of import by women to listening is inferred by women’s normally lower rate of interruption — i.e., disrupting the flow of conversation with a topic unrelated to the previous one — and by their largely increased use of minimal responses in relation to men. Men, however, interrupt far more frequently with non-related topics, especially in the mixed sex setting and, far from rendering a female speaker's responses minimal, are apt to greet her conversational spotlights with silence, as the work of Victoria DeFrancisco demonstrates.

8. Dominance versus subjection

This, in turn, suggests a dichotomy between a male desire for conversational dominance – noted by Helena Leet-Pellegrini with reference to male experts speaking more verbosely than their female counterparts – and a female aspiration to group conversational participation. One corollary of this is, according to Jennifer Coates, that males are afforded more attention in the context of the classroom and that this can lead to their gaining more attention in scientific and technical subjects, which in turn can lead to their achieving better success in those areas, ultimately leading to their having more power in a technocratic society.

9. Politeness

Lakoff (1975) identified three forms of politeness: formal, deference, and camaraderie. Women's language is characterized by formal and deference politeness, whereas men’s language is exemplified by camaraderie.

Politeness in speech is described in terms of positive and negative face. Positive face refers to one's desire to be liked and admired, while negative face refers to one's wish to remain autonomous and not to suffer imposition. Both forms, according to Penelope Brown’s study of the Tzeltal language, are used more frequently by women whether in mixed or single-sex pairs, suggesting for Brown a greater sensitivity in women than have men to face the needs of others. In short, women are to all intents and purposes largely more polite than men. However, negative face politeness can be potentially viewed as weak language because of its associated hedges and tag questions, a view propounded by O’Barr and Atkins (1980) in their work on courtroom interaction.

E. GENDER AND SPEECH STYLE

Goddard and Patterson (2000) stated that the first linguist who wrote the differences about male and female language was Otto Japerson. His book entitled Language: its Nature, Development and Origin (1922) described men are seen as the norm and women as departing from that norm in various ways-as being deviant. He further explained that women are seen as having limited vocabularies: ‘the vocabulary of a woman as a rule is much less extensive than that of man’. They are also describes as being rather delicate, easily offended and oblique.

Lakoff in 1975 is one of feminist who gave critique to Japerson view. Her central point was that women were socialized into sounding like ‘ladies’ because woman has power as the man has.

Lakoff's writings have become the basis for much research on the subject of women's language. Her famous work, Language and Woman's Place, introduced to the field of sociolinguistics many ideas about women's language that are now commonplace. She proposed (Language and Woman's Place) that women's speech can be distinguished from that of men in a number of ways, including:

• Hedge: using phrases like “sort of”, “kind of”, “it seems like”, and so on.

• Use (super) polite forms: “Would you mind...”, “I'd appreciate it if...”, “...if you don't mind”.

• Use tag questions: “You're going to dinner, aren't you?”

• Speak in italics: intentional emphasis equal to underlining words - so, very, quite.

• Use empathy adjectives: divine, lovely, adorable, and so on

• Use hypercorrect grammar and pronunciation: English prestige grammar and clear enunciation.

• Use direct quotation: men paraphrase more often.

• Have a special lexicon: women use more words for things like colors, men for sports.

• Use question intonation in declarative statements: women make declarative statements into questions by raising the pitch of their voice at the end of a statement, expressing uncertainty. For example, “What school do you attend? Eton College?”

• Use “wh-” imperatives: (such as, “Why don't you open the door?”)

• Speak less frequently

• Overuse qualifiers: (for example, “I think that...”)

• Apologize more: (for instance, “I'm sorry, but I think that...”)

• Use modal constructions: (such as can, would, should, ought - “Should we turn up the heat?”)

• Avoid coarse language or expletives

• Use indirect commands and requests: (for example, “My, isn't it cold in here?” - really a request to turn the heat on or close a window)

• Use more intensifiers: especially so and very (for instance, “I am so glad you came!”)

• Lack a sense of humor: women do not tell jokes well and often don't understand the punch line of jokes.

F.CROSS GENDER CONVERSATION

When we turn to matters having to do with how men and women use language in a wider sense, the possible explanation of these differences is in social interaction in conversations involving both men and women many researchers agree that men speak more than woman do. One also found that when men talked to men, the content categories of such talk focused on competition and teasing, sports, aggression, and doing things. On the other hand, when woman talked to women, the equivalent categories were the self, feelings, affiliation with others, home and family. Wardaugh (2002: 322) stated that when the two genders interacted, men tended to take the initiative in conversation, but there seem to be a desire to achieve some kind of accommodation so far as topics were concerned: the men spoke less aggressively and competitively and the women reduce their amount of talk about home and family.

Women are expected to use and do use talk to a greater extent than men to serve the function of establishing and maintaining personal relationships (this is not surprising, as the responsibility for the interpersonal relationships primarily rests with women); for example women, to a greater extent than men, are expected to talk, and do talk, simply in order to keep the interaction flowing smoothly and to show goodwill toward others, and they are expected to talk, and do talk, about personal feelings and other socioemotional matters relevant to interpersonal relationships to a greater extent than men. What is particular important in female friendships is the sharing of intimate feelings and confidences through talk, whereas in male friendship the sharing of activities is more important.

Another interesting claim is that in cross-gender conversations men frequently interrupt women but women much less frequently interrupt men (Zimmerman and west, 1975 in Wardaugh, 2002). They further stated that there are three claims of interest that must be seen in analyzing cross-gender conversation. The first claim is that men and women are biologically different and that this difference has serious consequences for gender. Women are somehow predisposed psychologically to be involved with one another and to be supportive and non-competitive. While, men are innately predisposed to independence. The second claim is that social organization is the best perceived as some kind of hierarchical set of power relationship. Language behavior reflects the social dominance of men. And the third claim is men and women are social being who have learned to act in certain ways. Language behavior is largely learned behavior. As society subjects, men and women have different life experiences.

G. CONCLUSION

Gender and sex are different. Sex refers to biological characteristics, and gender is a term to classify nouns such as masculine, feminine, and neuter to introduce the concept of grammatical.

There are two paradigms in studying gender. They are dominance and difference. In this case, dominance is the theory in which men are more likely to interrupt than women. However, according Tannen there are six contrast between male and female language; status vs support, independence vs intimacy, advice vs understanding, information vs feeling, orders vs proposals, and conflict vs compromise.

In communication, women and men are used different languages. The differences can be seen from their speech style, their speech practice and cross gender conversation. Lakof in her book entitled “Language and Woman’s Place” proposed some differences between women and men speech style. The differences includes hedge, use of polite form, tag question, and soon. The points focus in the topic of conversation, self disclosure, verbal aggression, listen and attentiveness, dominance vs subjection and politeness. Men and women are also different in their conversation. It will be different based on the topic they are discussed. Women tend to discuss about home and family. However, men like to discuss about sports, politics, competition and teasing.

REFERENCES

……….Language and Gender. http://semantics.uchicago.edu/kennedy/classes/sum07/myths/myths4-gender.pdf

………Language and Gender. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Language and Gender

Goddard, A and Patterson,L. 2000. Language and Gender.London: Routledge Inc

Lakoff,R .1975. Language and Woman Place. New York: Harper and Row

Wardaugh,Ronald.1998. An introduction to Sociolinguistics. USA: Blackwell Publisher.Inc

Weatherall,Ann. 2002. Gender, Language, Discourse; USA: Routledge Inc.

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PRAGMATICS PERFORMATIVE

I.BACKGROUND

Before talking about performative theory, it is important to talk about the classification of sentence which is proposed by structure traditional linguists. According to structure traditional linguists, there are three types of sentences; (1) declarative sentence, (2) interrogative sentence, and (3) imperative sentence. Declarative sentence is a sentence that contains thing which is used to ask listener to pay attention only, not to do anything because the speaker’s goal is just to tell the listener only. Interrogative sentence is a sentence that has content to ask the listener to answer the question orally. Therefore, the speaker not only asks for attention but also ask for question. While imperative sentence is a sentence that has content to ask the listener to give a compliment in the form of action, the speaker asks the listener to do something (Chaer, 2004:50).

One of philosophers, Austin (1962), differentiated declarative sentence, based on its meaning, into performative and constative utterance. The saying of an utterance which is used to do something as such example is called performative utterance. Performative sentence or utterance is derived from “perform”, the usual verb with the noun ‘action’ which indicate that expressing of the utterance is to perform or to do an action beside to say something.

Performative utterance is an utterance that shows an action have been done by the speaker. By expressing the utterance, the action is accomplished at that time too. For example: in utterance ‘I express my thank’, the speaker expresses and accomplishes the action ‘express’ (Kridalaksana, 1984:2001). Performative (in speech act theory): an utterance which performs an act, such as watch out (=warning), I promise not to be late (=a promise). It is said shortly that performative utterance is an utterance to perform the action.

Performative utterance is not evaluated as true or false, but as felicitous or infelicitous. For example:

• I promise that I shall be there.

• I do (take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife)- as uttered in the course of the marriage ceremony.

• I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth. This sentence is uttered when smashing the bottle against the stern.

• I give and bequeath my watch to my brother. (The act of bequeathing).

• I bet you Mike Tyson will win. (The act of betting).

• I apologize for coming late. (The act of apologizing).

• I express my special thanks to your kindness. (The act of thinking).

• I pronounce you husband and wife. (The act of marrying).

• I go now. (The act of going).

The examples given all share several qualities. They all include a particular type of verb- a performative verb- that realizes a particular action when uttered in a specific context: such a contex can include setting (a marriage ceremony, writing a will), physical objects (a ship, legal documents), and institutional identities.

Constative utterance on the other hand is an utterance which is used to describe or to examine event, process, circumstance, etc. and it characteristic is true or false (Kridalaksana, 1984:2001). For example:

1. Mr. John Smith is our lecture.

2. Ali goes to market.

3. I slept at hotel, etc.

However, through this paper, we will see that Leech views contrast with the above classification of performative and we will see the arguments who again and support such views. Some examples of performtive views will be explored in this paper.

II. DISSCUSSION

2.1 THE FORMATIVE AND ILLOCUTIONARY – VERB FALLACIES

Leech proposes his different argument about two theses which he considered as fallacies, and which have influenced thinking about illocutionary force, particularly through the work of Austin and Searle. The illocutionary verb-fallacy according to Leech is the view that the analysis of illocutionary force can be suitably approached through the analysis of the meaning of illocutionary verbs such as advises, command, and promise. This is considered as fallacy by Leech because Leech’s argument is the meaning of illocutionary verb as a part of grammar has to be analyzed categorically. On the other hand, the illocutionary force as a part of pragmatic has to be analyzed in rhetorical and noncategorical terms. When we are analyzing illocutionary verbs, we are dealing with grammar, whereas when we are analyzing the illocutionary force of utterances, we are dealing with pragmatics.

There is one case of illocutionary-verb fallacy which is called performative fallacy. This thesis says that performative, a sentence that contains explicit performative verb is the general principle to explain the force of other utterances. This fallacy arouses an assumption that the meaning of nonperformative sentence can be made explicit by adding some performative prelude. For example:

1. He did not do it. (implicit nonperformatve)

2. I state that he did not do it. ( explicit performative)

3. I maintain that he did not do it. (explicit performative)

What is considered as a fallacy by Leech is sentence one is equivalent to sentence two or three.

Another special case of the performative fallacy is the performative hypothesis of Ross (1970) and others, that the main verb of the underlying semantic structure of every sentence is a performative, ie that deep down in its

deep structure. In the case of those sentences, every sentence like (1) has a form something like (2a).

2.2 THE SPEECH ACT THEORIES OF AUSTIN AND SEARLE

According to Leech, both Austin and Searle flirt with the performative fallacy and end up embracing the illocutionary –verb fallacy. In the following are the history of performative utterances based on Austin and Searle.

The original idea in Austin’s How to do things with words (1962) was that performative utterances are fundamentally different from constative utterances. Whereas constative utterances could be evaluated in traditional terms of truth and falsehood, performative were neither true nor false: instead, they were to be regarded as felicitous and non-felicitous. But examples such as (1) and (2a) above led Austin to the eventual conclusion that all utterances are performative in the sense of constituting a form of action, rather than simply a matter of saying something about the world. For example: (1) I promise that I shall be there, (2) I shall be there.

Finally, Austin concluded that all regular utterances like (3) and (4), whether they have a performative verb or not, there is both a ‘doing’ element and a ‘saying’ element; that conclusion led Austin to differentiate between locutionary act, illocutionary act, and perlocutionary act. Finally he classified the illovcutionary acts into verdictive, exercitives, commisives, behabitives, and expositives. This classification is a prime example of what Leech has said as illocutionary- verb fallacy.

The examples of illocutionary acts based on Austin category:

1. Verdictives: used to say decision or assessment.

Example: I state that the defendant is guilty

2. Excercitives is a sentence used to say advice, warning, hope, etc.

Example: I hope you agree with this decision.

3. Commissives is a sentence that is characterized by an appointment

Example: I promise to see you

4. Expositives: used to explain something.

Example: I explain you that he is not guilty

5. Behatitives: a sentence relates with social attitude because someone get good or bad thing. Example: I congratulate on your success

2.3 DECLARATIONS

Declaration (according to Searle) is a special category of speech act because they are performed by someone who is authorized. For example: in case of naming a ship (I name this ship), making a vow (I vow), sentencing a criminal (I sentence you to death), or of bidding at an auction is performed (I vow), etc.

Declaration has special characteristics;

1. Declaration is done by someone who has special authority.

2. Declaration does not involve politeness principle.

2.4 ILLOCUTIONARY PERFORMATIVE: DESCRIPTIVE AND NON-DESCRIPTIVE APPROACHES

We have seen that performative is the most explicit form of illocutionary act. Semantically, the performative itself has special characteristics:

1. The verb of the main clause is an illocutionary verb.

2. This verb is in the simple present tense.

3. The subject of this verb is in the first person.

4. The indirect object of this verb is you.

5. Optionally, this verb is preceded by the adverb hereby.

6. The verb is followed (except in elliptical cases) by a reported-speech clause.

For example:

1. I order you to stand up.

2. I impere you to sit down.

3. I sentence you to death.

4. I maintain that the United Nations is nothing but a talking-shop.

5. I hereby agree with you that the United Nations is just a talking- shop.

Related to illocutionary performative, there are two views are descriptive and non-descriptive views. A descriptive view is carried by Leech, etc., while non-descriptive views are carried by Austin, and Searle.

Arguments of Descriptivist:

1. Performative does not underly every single utterance.

2. Does not contrast between performative and constative utterance because performaive is a special category of speech act.

3. Performative can be denied in a special circumstance.

4. Performative is subset of oratio oblique proposition.

5. Adopt a complementarist position, arguing that the peculiarity of performative is predictable from their sense and the relation between sense and force.

On the other hand, the arguments of non-descriptivist are:

1. Performative underlay every single utterance.

2. Performative is different with constative utterance.

3. Performative can not be denied.

4. The similarities between performative and oratio oblique are fortuitous.

5. Adopts a semanticist position, maintaining that peculiarity of performatives is a matter of their fundamental logical status.

2.5 ILLOCUTIONARY PERFORMATIVES AND ORATIO OBLIQUA

Actually, most of illocutionary performative is the same with oratio obliqua utterances which is necessary called indirect speech and paralleled with performative, example:

- I will telephone you.

This utterance is not complex because as a direct speech and the pronouns of I and you refer respectively to each other. It is differently with the utterance below:

- Bill assured Pat that he would telephone her.

The example above is a inderect speech or oratio obliqua which looks more complex representation. It is also available of primary speech situation and the secondary speech situation. Leech derives it as first utterance and second utterance. “First utterance is in Bill assured Pat that he would telephone her”, and the second utterance is that he would telephone her. The same case can also be found in the sentence below:

- I assure you that I’ll telephone you.

The identity of the primary and secondary speech situation is shown by the U1 and U2 on the sentence above. And the secondary utterance (U2) can be identified on I’ll telephone you.

A. Time of Primary Situation = Time of Secondary Situation

The illocutionary verb is in the present tense seems to mean that it describes a speech act taking place at the present time, in example at the time of the primary speech act. But this is not the whole explanation. A verb in the present tense need not refer to an event happening at the time of speech, as is

clear from an example like I knock off work early on Fridays. This sentence is likely to be uttered at a time other that knocking-off time on a Friday, and it is not likely that the event of uttering the sentence itself. The reason, clearly, is that the sentence has a habitual interpretation.

There is also, a non-habitual or punctual interpretation of the present tense with action verbs. This instantaneous present means that the event described takes place (ex: begins and ends) at the very time of speaking, and for pragmatic reasons, this in turn tends to imply that the event described is brief. Thus, the instantaneous sense of the present tense occurs for example in sport commentaries as in Zidane passes the ball to Henry, but not in the description of longer events. It is done only in that short time. The other example is “he reads a book” must be given a habitual interpretation, whereas He is reading a book, which refers to an actual present activity, also implies that the activity has been in progress before the moment of speech, and will continue in progress after it.

Another kind of situation in which the ‘instantaneous present’ occurs is in the enactment of ceremonies, where the speaker performs a ritual action and describes himself as performing it at the same time:

a) I give this ring (gives ring) - in a marriage ceremony.

b) I sign you with the cross (makes the sign) - in a baptism

c) I declare the meeting open

d) Saya nikahkan kamu (I marry you) - in Islam religion or marriage ceremony.

B. U1 = U2 (Primary Utterance = Secondary Utterance)

This equation can be seen on the example below:

I told her: ‘I’ll telephone you later.’

(direct speech)

I promised her that I’d telephone her later

(Oratio obliqua)

With direct speech, the reporter is committed to giving a verbatim report of what was said; in oratio obliqua, he is not so committed rather, he is committed to giving a description of the utterance’s meaning. Unlike the both example above, could be a correct report of an utterance such as O. K., I’ll phone you in a few minutes, or Don’t worry-I’ll call you around eight. There is no need for the words used in the secondary utterance to appear in the primary utterance. It remains to be shown that U1 = U2 is plausible not only on grammatical, but on pragmatic grounds. So, oratio boliqua is metapropositional rather than strictly metalinguistic.

2.6 THE PRAGMATICS OF ILLOCUTIONARY PERFORMATIVES

In this sub tittle, the perfomative theory is possible to be described and not only plausible interpretation but also accepts the present tense of the performative verb as non-habitual. Then the performative can be direved into several properties as like semantically, pragmatically and performative itself.

Semantically, it is a proposition with a present-tense verb, and is ambiguous between the habitual and instantaneous interpretations. But pragmatically, it is a self-naming utterance which has the force indicated by its main verb. Thus the performative wears its illocutionary heart on its sleeve, whereas for non pragmatically (in example is implicit rather than explicit).

Then, the relation of a performative to its non-performative analogue:

- I admit that Gus is greedy

- Gus is greedy

This relation has been assumed to be one of equivalence, and has thereby been made much of in standard treatments of performatives, the first point to make here is that in the complementarist view, as has been made clear, this is not an equivalence relation. It just a kind of rough equivalence like the example above the first sentence note that the speaker commits himself to the truth of the proposition that ‘Gus is greedy’. Then the performative is semantically a proposition, the derivation of its force from its sense follows

the pattern already proposed for affirmative declarative utterance. in this way, the descriptive view of performatives accords with the observation that

a. Performatives are often partly equivalent to their non-performative analogues, but

b. Performatives express additional meaning which, if conveyed at all, is only conveyed implicitly by their non-performative analogues.

2.7 THE PERFORMATIVE HYPOTHESIS

The illocutionary – verb Fallacy apply a fortiori to the performative hypothesis of Ross (1970) and others is quite different with Leech’s hypothesis. The difference is, depend on Leech, performative must be structurally; indirect speech or oratio obliqua. But for the other linguist almost each of sentence has a performative value. As already expalined, the hypothesis that in its underlying structure, every sentence has a higher clause with the properties of a performative. For example: Be careful. It has a value or meaning behind the utterance, that is I (impere you [that you be careful]). Here impere is meant to be a generalized imperative verb: the actual identity of the performative verb, or even whether it has an overtd surface-structure form at all, is not essential to the hypothesis. The equivalence between the performative and its non-performative analogue is here achieved by the straight forward device of syntactic transformation. Actually Ross only continues the opinion of Austin and derived also by Searle, Sadock, etc.

Thus, although there would be no point in marshalling either old or new arguments against the hypothesis here, there is some value in briefly considering why the performative hypothesis arose, and why the obvious appeal it had for many linguists in the early 1970s did not persist. The origininal arguments in favour of te hypothesis were regarded as ‘syntactic’ arguments, like Ross admitted that the performative hypothesis could be replaced by a ‘pragmatic hypothesis’ which would be as expalanatory as the

performative hypothesis. Once, this step had been taken, the performative hypothesis would have be come unnecessary. But for many linguists of the early 1970s it was difficult to conceive of any linguistic explanation which did not take place within the framework of grammar. Hence Ross’s correct insight – that the pragmatic hypothesis would be preferable to the performative hypothesis – was subsequntly ignored both by himself and by others.

On the other hand, Leech’s performative hypothesis can be simplified that

1. Indirect force can be adequately represented by performative verb-an approach which difference with the subtlety of indirectness

2. It treats the distinction between direct and indirect force

3. No attempt is made to give a functional motivation for the relation between sense and force

2.8 THE EXTENDED PERFORMATIVE HYPOTHESIS

Variant of performatives is the most extreme manifestation to be developed detail by Sadock (1974) and also in Cole and Morgan (1975). They are called the extended performative hypothesis. This is the hypothesis that the illocutionary force not only of a direct speech act, but also of an indirect speech act, acn be appropriately formalized in a performative deep structure. For example, an indirect request such as “Can you close the window?” Would be derived from a deep structure roughly like “I request that you close the window.” Although Sadock does not claim that all indirect illocution can be explained in this way, he does claim that some can, and moreover that it is possible to provide a set of criteria of deciding whether the underlying performative represents the indirect illocutionary force or not.

In all significant respects, the present account is completely at odds with the extended performative hypothesis.

1. The hypothesis implies that indirect force can be adequately represented by a performative verb – an approach which totally fails to deal with the subtlety of indirectness in human communication.

2. It treats the distinction between direct and indirect force as simply an all-or-nothing matter.

3. No attempt is made to give a functional motivation for the relation between sense and force: for the extended performative hypothesis, it is just an arbitrary fact of grammar that a request can be rendered by means of a Can you? question, but non (say) by means of a Shall I? question.

4. The relation between the direct and indirect force of an utterance as an information question and as a request for action is seen as a grammatical ambiguity, rather than as a matter of two coexisting meanings, one being conveyed by virtue of the other. So Leech argues that the extended performative hypothesis fails to account for fairly obvious and commonplace observations about how linguistic communication works.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on to Austin and Searly regarded a taxonomy as a system of categories and subcategories, the classification of illocutionary acts has been an important pastime of those wishing to make a thorough survey of ‘the things one can do with words’. And, it tended to reflect the assumption that the existence of an illocutionary performative verb justifies the existence of an illocutionary category.

Contrasly, Leech interested to the meaning and classification of speech act verbs. Even the classification theory of other reserachers is the same subject, but there is a significant shift of viewpoint: its meaning not as a key to the nature of illocutionary act, but as the key to how people talk about illocutionary act.

REFERENCES

Leech, Geoffrey, 1983. Principle of Pragmatics. New York: Longman inc.

Schiffrin, Deborah, 1994. Approaches to Discourse. USA: Blackwell Publishers.

Chaer,dkk, 2004, Sosiolinguistik: Perkenalan Awal. Jakarta: PT Rineka Cipta.

Thomas, Jenny, 1948. Meaning and Interaction: an introduction to pragmatics. New York: Longman

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