1.05.2012

PRAGMATICS PERFORMATIVE

I.BACKGROUND
Before talking about performative theory, it is important to talk about the classification of sentence which is proposed by structure traditional linguists. According to structure traditional linguists, there are three types of sentences; (1) declarative sentence, (2) interrogative sentence, and (3) imperative sentence. Declarative sentence is a sentence that contains thing which is used to ask listener to pay attention only, not to do anything because the speaker’s goal is just to tell the listener only. Interrogative sentence is a sentence that has content to ask the listener to answer the question orally. Therefore, the speaker not only asks for attention but also ask for question. While imperative sentence is a sentence that has content to ask the listener to give a compliment in the form of action, the speaker asks the listener to do something (Chaer, 2004:50).
One of philosophers, Austin (1962), differentiated declarative sentence, based on its meaning, into performative and constative utterance. The saying of an utterance which is used to do something as such example is called performative utterance. Performative sentence or utterance is derived from “perform”, the usual verb with the noun ‘action’ which indicate that expressing of the utterance is to perform or to do an action beside to say something.
Performative utterance is an utterance that shows an action have been done by the speaker. By expressing the utterance, the action is accomplished at that time too. For example: in utterance ‘I express my thank’, the speaker expresses and accomplishes the action ‘express’ (Kridalaksana, 1984:2001). Performative (in speech act theory): an utterance which performs an act, such as watch out (=warning), I promise not to be late (=a promise). It is said shortly that performative utterance is an utterance to perform the action.


Performative utterance is not evaluated as true or false, but as felicitous or infelicitous. For example:
• I promise that I shall be there.
• I do (take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife)- as uttered in the course of the marriage ceremony.
• I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth. This sentence is uttered when smashing the bottle against the stern.
• I give and bequeath my watch to my brother. (The act of bequeathing).
• I bet you Mike Tyson will win. (The act of betting).
• I apologize for coming late. (The act of apologizing).
• I express my special thanks to your kindness. (The act of thinking).
• I pronounce you husband and wife. (The act of marrying).
• I go now. (The act of going).
The examples given all share several qualities. They all include a particular type of verb- a performative verb- that realizes a particular action when uttered in a specific context: such a contex can include setting (a marriage ceremony, writing a will), physical objects (a ship, legal documents), and institutional identities.
Constative utterance on the other hand is an utterance which is used to describe or to examine event, process, circumstance, etc. and it characteristic is true or false (Kridalaksana, 1984:2001). For example:
1. Mr. John Smith is our lecture.
2. Ali goes to market.
3. I slept at hotel, etc.
However, through this paper, we will see that Leech views contrast with the above classification of performative and we will see the arguments who again and support such views. Some examples of performtive views will be explored in this paper.



II. DISSCUSSION
2.1 THE FORMATIVE AND ILLOCUTIONARY – VERB FALLACIES
Leech proposes his different argument about two theses which he considered as fallacies, and which have influenced thinking about illocutionary force, particularly through the work of Austin and Searle. The illocutionary verb-fallacy according to Leech is the view that the analysis of illocutionary force can be suitably approached through the analysis of the meaning of illocutionary verbs such as advises, command, and promise. This is considered as fallacy by Leech because Leech’s argument is the meaning of illocutionary verb as a part of grammar has to be analyzed categorically. On the other hand, the illocutionary force as a part of pragmatic has to be analyzed in rhetorical and noncategorical terms. When we are analyzing illocutionary verbs, we are dealing with grammar, whereas when we are analyzing the illocutionary force of utterances, we are dealing with pragmatics.
There is one case of illocutionary-verb fallacy which is called performative fallacy. This thesis says that performative, a sentence that contains explicit performative verb is the general principle to explain the force of other utterances. This fallacy arouses an assumption that the meaning of nonperformative sentence can be made explicit by adding some performative prelude. For example:
1. He did not do it. (implicit nonperformatve)
2. I state that he did not do it. ( explicit performative)
3. I maintain that he did not do it. (explicit performative)
What is considered as a fallacy by Leech is sentence one is equivalent to sentence two or three.
Another special case of the performative fallacy is the performative hypothesis of Ross (1970) and others, that the main verb of the underlying semantic structure of every sentence is a performative, ie that deep down in its
deep structure. In the case of those sentences, every sentence like (1) has a form something like (2a).
2.2 THE SPEECH ACT THEORIES OF AUSTIN AND SEARLE
According to Leech, both Austin and Searle flirt with the performative fallacy and end up embracing the illocutionary –verb fallacy. In the following are the history of performative utterances based on Austin and Searle.
The original idea in Austin’s How to do things with words (1962) was that performative utterances are fundamentally different from constative utterances. Whereas constative utterances could be evaluated in traditional terms of truth and falsehood, performative were neither true nor false: instead, they were to be regarded as felicitous and non-felicitous. But examples such as (1) and (2a) above led Austin to the eventual conclusion that all utterances are performative in the sense of constituting a form of action, rather than simply a matter of saying something about the world. For example: (1) I promise that I shall be there, (2) I shall be there.
Finally, Austin concluded that all regular utterances like (3) and (4), whether they have a performative verb or not, there is both a ‘doing’ element and a ‘saying’ element; that conclusion led Austin to differentiate between locutionary act, illocutionary act, and perlocutionary act. Finally he classified the illovcutionary acts into verdictive, exercitives, commisives, behabitives, and expositives. This classification is a prime example of what Leech has said as illocutionary- verb fallacy.
The examples of illocutionary acts based on Austin category:
1. Verdictives: used to say decision or assessment.
Example: I state that the defendant is guilty
2. Excercitives is a sentence used to say advice, warning, hope, etc.
Example: I hope you agree with this decision.

3. Commissives is a sentence that is characterized by an appointment
Example: I promise to see you
4. Expositives: used to explain something.
Example: I explain you that he is not guilty
5. Behatitives: a sentence relates with social attitude because someone get good or bad thing. Example: I congratulate on your success

2.3 DECLARATIONS
Declaration (according to Searle) is a special category of speech act because they are performed by someone who is authorized. For example: in case of naming a ship (I name this ship), making a vow (I vow), sentencing a criminal (I sentence you to death), or of bidding at an auction is performed (I vow), etc.
Declaration has special characteristics;
1. Declaration is done by someone who has special authority.
2. Declaration does not involve politeness principle.

2.4 ILLOCUTIONARY PERFORMATIVE: DESCRIPTIVE AND NON-DESCRIPTIVE APPROACHES
We have seen that performative is the most explicit form of illocutionary act. Semantically, the performative itself has special characteristics:
1. The verb of the main clause is an illocutionary verb.
2. This verb is in the simple present tense.
3. The subject of this verb is in the first person.
4. The indirect object of this verb is you.
5. Optionally, this verb is preceded by the adverb hereby.
6. The verb is followed (except in elliptical cases) by a reported-speech clause.


For example:
1. I order you to stand up.
2. I impere you to sit down.
3. I sentence you to death.
4. I maintain that the United Nations is nothing but a talking-shop.
5. I hereby agree with you that the United Nations is just a talking- shop.
Related to illocutionary performative, there are two views are descriptive and non-descriptive views. A descriptive view is carried by Leech, etc., while non-descriptive views are carried by Austin, and Searle.
Arguments of Descriptivist:
1. Performative does not underly every single utterance.
2. Does not contrast between performative and constative utterance because performaive is a special category of speech act.
3. Performative can be denied in a special circumstance.
4. Performative is subset of oratio oblique proposition.
5. Adopt a complementarist position, arguing that the peculiarity of performative is predictable from their sense and the relation between sense and force.
On the other hand, the arguments of non-descriptivist are:
1. Performative underlay every single utterance.
2. Performative is different with constative utterance.
3. Performative can not be denied.
4. The similarities between performative and oratio oblique are fortuitous.
5. Adopts a semanticist position, maintaining that peculiarity of performatives is a matter of their fundamental logical status.





2.5 ILLOCUTIONARY PERFORMATIVES AND ORATIO OBLIQUA
Actually, most of illocutionary performative is the same with oratio obliqua utterances which is necessary called indirect speech and paralleled with performative, example:

- I will telephone you.
This utterance is not complex because as a direct speech and the pronouns of I and you refer respectively to each other. It is differently with the utterance below:

- Bill assured Pat that he would telephone her.

The example above is a inderect speech or oratio obliqua which looks more complex representation. It is also available of primary speech situation and the secondary speech situation. Leech derives it as first utterance and second utterance. “First utterance is in Bill assured Pat that he would telephone her”, and the second utterance is that he would telephone her. The same case can also be found in the sentence below:

- I assure you that I’ll telephone you.

The identity of the primary and secondary speech situation is shown by the U1 and U2 on the sentence above. And the secondary utterance (U2) can be identified on I’ll telephone you.
A. Time of Primary Situation = Time of Secondary Situation
The illocutionary verb is in the present tense seems to mean that it describes a speech act taking place at the present time, in example at the time of the primary speech act. But this is not the whole explanation. A verb in the present tense need not refer to an event happening at the time of speech, as is

clear from an example like I knock off work early on Fridays. This sentence is likely to be uttered at a time other that knocking-off time on a Friday, and it is not likely that the event of uttering the sentence itself. The reason, clearly, is that the sentence has a habitual interpretation.
There is also, a non-habitual or punctual interpretation of the present tense with action verbs. This instantaneous present means that the event described takes place (ex: begins and ends) at the very time of speaking, and for pragmatic reasons, this in turn tends to imply that the event described is brief. Thus, the instantaneous sense of the present tense occurs for example in sport commentaries as in Zidane passes the ball to Henry, but not in the description of longer events. It is done only in that short time. The other example is “he reads a book” must be given a habitual interpretation, whereas He is reading a book, which refers to an actual present activity, also implies that the activity has been in progress before the moment of speech, and will continue in progress after it.
Another kind of situation in which the ‘instantaneous present’ occurs is in the enactment of ceremonies, where the speaker performs a ritual action and describes himself as performing it at the same time:
a) I give this ring (gives ring) - in a marriage ceremony.
b) I sign you with the cross (makes the sign) - in a baptism
c) I declare the meeting open
d) Saya nikahkan kamu (I marry you) - in Islam religion or marriage ceremony.

B. U1 = U2 (Primary Utterance = Secondary Utterance)
This equation can be seen on the example below:
I told her: ‘I’ll telephone you later.’
(direct speech)
I promised her that I’d telephone her later
(Oratio obliqua)

With direct speech, the reporter is committed to giving a verbatim report of what was said; in oratio obliqua, he is not so committed rather, he is committed to giving a description of the utterance’s meaning. Unlike the both example above, could be a correct report of an utterance such as O. K., I’ll phone you in a few minutes, or Don’t worry-I’ll call you around eight. There is no need for the words used in the secondary utterance to appear in the primary utterance. It remains to be shown that U1 = U2 is plausible not only on grammatical, but on pragmatic grounds. So, oratio boliqua is metapropositional rather than strictly metalinguistic.

2.6 THE PRAGMATICS OF ILLOCUTIONARY PERFORMATIVES
In this sub tittle, the perfomative theory is possible to be described and not only plausible interpretation but also accepts the present tense of the performative verb as non-habitual. Then the performative can be direved into several properties as like semantically, pragmatically and performative itself.
Semantically, it is a proposition with a present-tense verb, and is ambiguous between the habitual and instantaneous interpretations. But pragmatically, it is a self-naming utterance which has the force indicated by its main verb. Thus the performative wears its illocutionary heart on its sleeve, whereas for non pragmatically (in example is implicit rather than explicit).
Then, the relation of a performative to its non-performative analogue:
- I admit that Gus is greedy
- Gus is greedy
This relation has been assumed to be one of equivalence, and has thereby been made much of in standard treatments of performatives, the first point to make here is that in the complementarist view, as has been made clear, this is not an equivalence relation. It just a kind of rough equivalence like the example above the first sentence note that the speaker commits himself to the truth of the proposition that ‘Gus is greedy’. Then the performative is semantically a proposition, the derivation of its force from its sense follows

the pattern already proposed for affirmative declarative utterance. in this way, the descriptive view of performatives accords with the observation that
a. Performatives are often partly equivalent to their non-performative analogues, but
b. Performatives express additional meaning which, if conveyed at all, is only conveyed implicitly by their non-performative analogues.

2.7 THE PERFORMATIVE HYPOTHESIS
The illocutionary – verb Fallacy apply a fortiori to the performative hypothesis of Ross (1970) and others is quite different with Leech’s hypothesis. The difference is, depend on Leech, performative must be structurally; indirect speech or oratio obliqua. But for the other linguist almost each of sentence has a performative value. As already expalined, the hypothesis that in its underlying structure, every sentence has a higher clause with the properties of a performative. For example: Be careful. It has a value or meaning behind the utterance, that is I (impere you [that you be careful]). Here impere is meant to be a generalized imperative verb: the actual identity of the performative verb, or even whether it has an overtd surface-structure form at all, is not essential to the hypothesis. The equivalence between the performative and its non-performative analogue is here achieved by the straight forward device of syntactic transformation. Actually Ross only continues the opinion of Austin and derived also by Searle, Sadock, etc.
Thus, although there would be no point in marshalling either old or new arguments against the hypothesis here, there is some value in briefly considering why the performative hypothesis arose, and why the obvious appeal it had for many linguists in the early 1970s did not persist. The origininal arguments in favour of te hypothesis were regarded as ‘syntactic’ arguments, like Ross admitted that the performative hypothesis could be replaced by a ‘pragmatic hypothesis’ which would be as expalanatory as the

performative hypothesis. Once, this step had been taken, the performative hypothesis would have be come unnecessary. But for many linguists of the early 1970s it was difficult to conceive of any linguistic explanation which did not take place within the framework of grammar. Hence Ross’s correct insight – that the pragmatic hypothesis would be preferable to the performative hypothesis – was subsequntly ignored both by himself and by others.
On the other hand, Leech’s performative hypothesis can be simplified that
1. Indirect force can be adequately represented by performative verb-an approach which difference with the subtlety of indirectness
2. It treats the distinction between direct and indirect force
3. No attempt is made to give a functional motivation for the relation between sense and force

2.8 THE EXTENDED PERFORMATIVE HYPOTHESIS
Variant of performatives is the most extreme manifestation to be developed detail by Sadock (1974) and also in Cole and Morgan (1975). They are called the extended performative hypothesis. This is the hypothesis that the illocutionary force not only of a direct speech act, but also of an indirect speech act, acn be appropriately formalized in a performative deep structure. For example, an indirect request such as “Can you close the window?” Would be derived from a deep structure roughly like “I request that you close the window.” Although Sadock does not claim that all indirect illocution can be explained in this way, he does claim that some can, and moreover that it is possible to provide a set of criteria of deciding whether the underlying performative represents the indirect illocutionary force or not.
In all significant respects, the present account is completely at odds with the extended performative hypothesis.


1. The hypothesis implies that indirect force can be adequately represented by a performative verb – an approach which totally fails to deal with the subtlety of indirectness in human communication.
2. It treats the distinction between direct and indirect force as simply an all-or-nothing matter.
3. No attempt is made to give a functional motivation for the relation between sense and force: for the extended performative hypothesis, it is just an arbitrary fact of grammar that a request can be rendered by means of a Can you? question, but non (say) by means of a Shall I? question.
4. The relation between the direct and indirect force of an utterance as an information question and as a request for action is seen as a grammatical ambiguity, rather than as a matter of two coexisting meanings, one being conveyed by virtue of the other. So Leech argues that the extended performative hypothesis fails to account for fairly obvious and commonplace observations about how linguistic communication works.

III. CONCLUSION
Based on to Austin and Searly regarded a taxonomy as a system of categories and subcategories, the classification of illocutionary acts has been an important pastime of those wishing to make a thorough survey of ‘the things one can do with words’. And, it tended to reflect the assumption that the existence of an illocutionary performative verb justifies the existence of an illocutionary category.
Contrasly, Leech interested to the meaning and classification of speech act verbs. Even the classification theory of other reserachers is the same subject, but there is a significant shift of viewpoint: its meaning not as a key to the nature of illocutionary act, but as the key to how people talk about illocutionary act.


REFERENCES
Leech, Geoffrey, 1983. Principle of Pragmatics. New York: Longman inc.
Schiffrin, Deborah, 1994. Approaches to Discourse. USA: Blackwell Publishers.
Chaer,dkk, 2004, Sosiolinguistik: Perkenalan Awal. Jakarta: PT Rineka Cipta.
Thomas, Jenny, 1948. Meaning and Interaction: an introduction to pragmatics. New York: Longman





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